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POST-SOVIET TRANSFORMATION FOR EVANGELICALS,
1991-2018: DEEPENING CAUSES FOR DISCORD1
Walter Sawatsky
Walter Sawatsky is Professor Emeritus of Church History and Mission at Anabaptist
Mennonite Biblical Seminary, Elkhart, Indiana, USA, and also Senior Research Fellow at
IBTS Centre, Amsterdam. He is a former editor and co-editor of OPREE and is currently a
member of the Board of Advisory Editors.

Surprised or Seeing the Continuities?
During the great transformation between 1989 and 1991, the majority of American
journalists were completely surprised by the transformations of 1989 in Eastern Europe and
the collapse of the USSR in 1991, since it contradicted their stereotypes so profoundly.
Several developments within the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe turned out to be signposts
for those with the eyes to see. Literary figures and philosophers circulating their thinking in
samizdat form, or through the emergence of dissenting movements, pointed to the
disillusionment with the grand socialist promises. Solzhenitsyn had already drawn attention in
his Nobel speech to the power of truth in a climate where everyone was expected to live the
lie. Czech playwright Vaclav Havel wrote an essay on the Power of the Powerless, also using
Christian imagery to call for a societal moral recovery. 2 That the economies of the Soviet
Union and many of the East European socialist states were slipping, rather than growing, was
a spreading anxiety among the newer elite of the nomenklatura, including within the planning
levels of the military. With the emergence of Mikhail Gorbachev as general secretary after a
series of old and tired Party rulers, his speeches and writing inspired ‘new thinking’, as did
his close adviser Alexander Yakovlev, who had been a Russian diplomat in Canada for a
decade. These new leaders called for a restructuring of the Soviet Union, for new thinking,
for greater attention to values and for the spiritual, instead of crass materialism.3

1

Article originally appeared in Baptistic Theologies, vol. 10, 2 (2018). Reprinted with permission of the editor.
Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s massive Gulag Archipelago had circulated in samizdat [self-publication], the
Nobel Speech and his critique of state and church leaders circulated widely in many languages; Vaclav Havel’s
Power of the Powerless was written at the time of the Charta movement of secular and religious dissidents, then
became a widespread statement for the ‘velvet revolution’ in the Czech Republic, frequently reprinted.
3
Then American Ambassador, Jack F. Matlock Jr., “A Big Part in the Big Change,” New York Review of Books
(23 June 2016), pp. 57-58.
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Those observing the religious world did report a religious quest among the
intelligentsia, by the mid-1970s flocking to a few reformist priests who spoke openly about a
resurrection coming. The Reform Baptist movement, as well as dissident Pentecostals and
Adventists, were not silenced by the 1960s’ campaign against religion. Already by 1976, the
appeals to religious freedoms guaranteed in Soviet law, and the Soviet Union’s desire to be
well regarded internationally, were having an impact. The number of evangelical prisoners of
conscience began to decline toward the end of the 1970s and ended around 1985. Slowly,
while state authorities over religion kept proclaiming there was no change in policy toward
religion, the signs that the struggle to eradicate religious practice was not succeeding were
mounting, so that some serious revision of the law on cults was anticipated. It came in 1990.
With that quick sketch, I am trying to indicate that the new religious freedoms were
not simply granted by the authorities; it was much more a story of more believers claiming
religious freedoms and acting on the implications, with the state authorities hesitating in
enforcing controls. In many work settings, administrators were openly saying that their
believing workers were more reliable, persons they respected, in contrast to the nasty
propaganda against them. Those social shifts toward a different way were tied closely to
Soviet and global responses to the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe and an earthquake disaster
in Armenia that made possible foreign aid, including by religious aid societies. There was a
call for the return of the word miloserdie (compassion) to Soviet society. Spontaneously up to
a thousand miloserdie societies were organized and registered—invariably a mix of Orthodox
and evangelical Protestant activists alongside secular people of good will.

Frenetic Evangelism, Fateful Transitions
From the vantage point of hindsight, it is possible to speak of the quarter century of
post-communism in several phases. Here, I limit myself to developments among evangelicals
and some Orthodox, and to note that there was an early desire to restore civil society, hence
the emergence of nongovernmental civil society projects of great diversity. In early 1989, on
my first visit since 1980 to the USSR, our delegation of Mennonite leaders arrived in
Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, where we were permitted to drive as far as Tokmak and Rot Front,
cities long closed to foreigners.
At the airport Andrei Barg, a Russian German minister in the main Evangelical
Christians-Baptists (ECB) congregation, took me aside to drive me to the hotel, while other
church leaders chauffeured my colleagues. We had met for fellowship more than a decade
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before, so we had much to catch up on. His opening remark was, “they called me in a week
ago, but I refused to go”. I knew who the ‘they’ were, the usual officials including the KGB,
who had harassed him throughout his ministry. But, said Barg, they said this was not a
request like before; they simply wanted to talk with him, they wanted to learn. So he went to
a meeting that included the mayor, school principals, the police, and Party leaders. They told
him that their city too, like elsewhere across the Soviet Union, was struggling with serious
social problems. The list of woes included drug use, high divorce rates, and a rising crime
rate. On the other hand, they all knew that the Baptist youth were not like that. They knew
about how they organized visits to lonely senior citizens to sing and pray with them. The
Christian families impressed them by their treatment of each other, plus their readiness to
help the poor around them. Therefore, the purpose of their request was to ask him what the
secret of the Christian churches was; could he describe what they were doing and why? Could
some of his colleagues come to speak in schools, or at factories, and answer whatever
questions the listeners had?
This was only one striking illustration of what began happening across the USSR. Not
only did thousands of Bibles get imported, it had also been a year to celebrate the millennium
of Christianity. In Karaganda, Kazakhstan, I chatted with an evangelical believer who told me
about the Orthodox priest who had looked frazzled but excited and eager to share. A retired
couple had come to him to ask for a church blessing on their marriage of long ago. With them
came their children, a legally married couple holding an infant. First the parents asked for
baptism, then the priest’s blessing on their marriage, before the priest performed a baptism of
the infant, in each case taking enough time to explain what these rituals meant and to ask if
they understood and affirmed them.
One Sunday in Moscow in 1990, I went to a nearby Orthodox parish for the morning
liturgy where a bishop was presiding. After the highpoint of the liturgy—the Eucharist—the
bishop came forward to deliver a short homily. “Most of you will have heard about the words
Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit and God the Father,” he said. “Today I am going to introduce
Jesus Christ to you.” It sounded rather like that conversation in John 3 when Jesus explained
the new birth to Nicodemus. In closing, the bishop invited visitors to come back next Sunday
when he would introduce them to the Holy Spirit. How often have any of us had the
opportunity for such basic teaching about Christianity as was then happening across the
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Soviet Union? It seemed as if everyone had seen the Repentance film, and could not forget
that closing line by the old woman: “What use is a road if it does not lead to a church?”4
It was indeed a time of frenetic evangelism. Simple believers, not just the ordained
ministers, seemed to get phone calls or people grabbing their arm in public to beg them to
come to their village, to their school, even to the prison nearby to talk about God. The Baptist
paper as well as Semchenko’s Protestant magazine were full of stories—about holding
singing and preaching services in the prisons where they once had been imprisoned for their
faith; visiting patients in hospitals who were surviving in unclean conditions; hospitals being
short-staffed, with low worker morale. Soon in many places, believers had become regular
volunteers in hospitals and state-run orphanages and seniors’ homes.
Already in 1990, the Mennonite Central Committee was able to set up an exchange of
healthcare professionals. The head of the largest hospital in Moscow, a psychologist from that
ill-famed psychiatric institute in Leningrad, and in total about a dozen nursing care and
medical specialists toured the USA together for two weeks, visiting both state facilities and
many of the Mennonite hospitals, mental health centers, and retirement homes to share
insights and experiences. On Sundays, the tour group members were taken to a half dozen
different churches and had dinner with families. Six months later, my wife Margaret and I
travelled with the American/Canadian Mennonite professionals, first to tour the former
Mennonite settlements around Zaporozhye, Ukraine, plus of course Kiev, St Petersburg and
Moscow, before each of the visitors was hosted for a week to 10 days in medical institutions
in those capital cities just mentioned, but also in Odessa and similar cities. It was eye-opening
on both sides, but in a number of cases, especially in the areas of social work and counselling
centers that were just beginning, relationships of cooperation through mentorships continued
for many years thereafter. It also served as a bridge between local Christians and such
medical professionals, usually not practicing believers, to establish friendships and organize
volunteers as needed.

Parallels and Differences in Eastern Europe
These forms of building new contacts and relationships were less dramatic across the
East European countries, often having started earlier. The phenomenon known as citizen

4

The then Georgian Party Secretary Shevardnadze had permitted production, then as USSR foreign secretary
encouraged Gorbachev to permit the showing of Pokoiane [Repentance] throughout the USSR. Tengiz
Abuladze’s film was made in 1984, but the release was banned until 1987, because of its allegorical critique of
Stalinist, and in more general terms, a totalitarian regime. It premiered in 1987 at the Cannes Film Festival.
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diplomacy had started at least by the mid-1980s. Once Polish General Jaruzelski declared
martial law around Christmas 1981, as a way to keep the Solidarity workers’ movement
within limits, President Reagan responded by imposing a sanction on the export of corn and
soybeans to small farmers in Poland producing broiler chickens for urban residents. That
winter chickens were quickly sold and such entrepreneurs became jobless; instead of chicken
sandwiches, there were mushroom burgers for sale. Then a quick thaw along the Vistula
River caused widespread flooding due to broken up ice. The German authorities soon after
approved sending food relief to the flooded regions, and church agencies from abroad, such
as Caritas, Baptist World Aid, and my own Mennonite Central Committee were sending relief
supplies.
Most memorable were the many German citizens who obtained addresses of churches
or social centers to which they delivered truck-loads of supplies from their own towns in
Germany. Then German foreign minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher announced that all relief
goods brought to the German post offices would be shipped to needy places in Poland for
free. This was a reconciliation and forgiveness moment between Germans and Poles, after the
horrible memories of Nazi occupation, displacement of people in order to settle diaspora
Germans from the Ukraine, as well as the ethnic cleansing of Jews. Some years later, the
Polish Catholic Bishops exchanged a reconciliation declaration with German Catholic
bishops.
Elsewhere citizen diplomacy usually started locally. A group in a West European
town sought out an East European town of similar size to establish a sister city relationship.
That might mean sending football (soccer) teams to play a tournament, visitors hosted in
homes, then a return engagement in the other town. In other cases, it was an exchange of
hobby clubs, or even parish exchanges. I recall being a guest in a Protestant church in the
Czech Republic more than a decade later, when their partner church from Munich presented a
worship service with shared stories about church events in both places, followed by a warm
fellowship around a meal before the Germans drove home for the night. By then such crossboundary, cross-cultural and cross-linguistic links had become normal.
An exchange student we had sponsored to study at Humboldt University in East
Germany kept a diary of events during the fall of 1989. 5 It included excerpts from fellow
student conversations, who were part of the Swords into Plowshares movement gaining

5

Mark Jantzen, The Wrong Side of the Wall: An American in East Berlin during the Peaceful Revolution
(Newton, KS: self-published, 1993).
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force, not only concerned for ending the Cold War stalemate, which had prompted so many
‘no future’ placards in demonstrations. They also went regularly to the Monday evening
worship service in Leipzig, followed by a candlelight march in the middle of the city. Sermon
excerpts were from the Sermon on the Mount, then a new best seller in West Germany, plus
quotations from Martin Luther King and Gandhi. They sang songs from the popular
Kirchentag gathering started by lay people after World War II, when church institutions had
lost so much trust. Social justice, peace, and integrity of creation were common themes in
those songs.
When the Berlin Wall came down, Vincent Harding, who had long headed the Martin
Luther King Center in Atlanta, was watching events on television, surprised that the people
were singing We Shall Overcome and Go Tell it on the Mountain.6 That set him thinking and
realizing, as a modern historian, that the human and civil rights movement was much bigger
than merely in the USA, that there was a solidarity globally that necessarily drew on the hope
for the oppressed—the constant theme of Isaiah and Jeremiah and many others—and hope for
the oppressed was in both the Benedictus of Zechariah and the Magnificat of Mary, and it was
unmistakable in the life and teaching of Jesus.
So where was this taking the evangelicals of Eurasia and Eastern Europe? They turned
their attention to marginalized fellow citizens. For East European Christians, as far back as
the early nineteenth century, it was the Pietist Awakening that had led to the founding of
long-term care hospitals for handicapped persons and for the mentally ill. Orphanages and
training centers for street kids in the newly industrializing cities had sprung up. In areas
where there were state churches or Volkskirchen, pastors, deaconesses, and other church
workers were paid out of a church tax managed by the state. The two world wars of the
twentieth century accounted for much of the destruction of such church-run institutions. It
took half a decade before the formerly well-organized Diakonisches Werk of the Evangelical
Church of Germany was finally able to resume activity for social needs inside West
Germany, much less so in East Germany.
The recovery across the neighboring East European church world took longer. A key
challenge for free or evangelical churches was to function without state subsidy, relying on
freewill donations. By 1989, when all of the East European states abandoned their socialist
forms of governance, many industries and state corporations that managed the economy now

6

Vincent Harding, Hope and History: Why We Must Share the Story of the Movement (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis
Books, 1990).
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tended to shift to free market economies. The transition was not as drastic as the privatization
process across the USSR, but it too did result in serious economic recessions.
So, in this context, one heard more frequently from the church leaders from Poland
and Germany all the way to Yugoslavia, that the public began expecting the churches to care
for civil society, at least for its marginalized people, to try to take on social ministries from
the past, but now with voluntary funds. One can generalize that many Christians worked hard
to assist their neighbors, but organized social services limped along, with international relief
and aid agencies making major contributions during the 1990s, then a more widespread
decline of charitable giving among developed societies became steadily more noticeable. This
latter feature is now a common point of anxiety across the East and West. Given that the
second decade of the twenty-first century has seen the growth of a populism characterized by
increased xenophobia to migrants and to other minority groups, with right-wing politicians
more openly engaging in hate speech, the societal oppression of minorities is rising. What
might cause a recovery of societal capacity for compassion?
Coming to Terms with Less – 1997-2008
For the second post-communism phase I have arbitrarily chosen to cover the
developments between 1997 and 2008. The revised Russian law on religion (1997) signaled
the beginning of new (or was it renewed?) controls over religious practice, presented as an
effort to block the foreign mission influence on Russian society. The Central Asian states
produced their own contextually distinct laws that seemed like a return to the Soviet war on
religion, but much more arbitrary. The changes in Ukraine and Mongolia were not as
prominent, as was true in Eastern European states where the steady increase of majoritarian
thinking was expressed more in nationalist or even racist tones, than specifically against
religion. The beginning of a third phase during 2008 points again to the role of economic
crises in shaping evangelical experiences, in particular the new isolationism over against the
West (as then painted in the media in increasingly negative tones) and still no broad shared
vision of the way toward a good and healthy society. Given the indicators of increased
authoritarianism and corruption, it was not really a turn to the rule of law, it was a time for
evangelicals and for many renewal-seeking Orthodox to turn inward, focused on ways to
survive until the political and social winds might change, without a promising leadership
waiting in the wings.
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It was the contrasts between the euphoria of the millennium year, the high hopes that
Russia, possibly all of Eastern Europe, would turn to God as source of hope and vision, and
then the spreading sense by 2008 that the lights were slowly going out. In Russia, the
Christian role in society was more obviously turning out to be used as sham: the hypocritical
top politicians seen to attend worship, take communion, with Patriarch Kirill speaking more
as voice for Great Russia than as church leader. By 2008, the enthusiasm for theological
training began to wane. What might someone with a Master of Divinity degree do after
graduation, particularly if that did not appear to include salaried pastoral work? In places,
there was a backlash against returning seminary graduates who now sounded as if the
theology from the West they had learned was the way of thinking all should adopt. One of
those points of conflict centered on the teaching of eternal security that seemed alien to
historic Slavic tendencies toward Arminian forms of Reformed theology.
In general, the value of theologically-trained pastors needed to be learned by
congregations through experience. Even the emerging emphasis on pastoral care and
counselling, and on more participatory ways of doing Bible study, and on the voluntary social
services in the community were transformations needing a learning curve. Since the new
ideas came from the schools and their teachers, to a great extent from foreign guest
professors, what had not developed widely was group discussion and discernment at both
leadership level and congregational level, to gain consensus for direction and change.
The Evangelical Role in Unfriendly Societies – 2008 into the Future
While teaching a short course, I was invited by Andrei Puzynin, then Rector of Realis
in Kiev, to go for evening prayers to one of the new churches in Kiev, started by Western
evangelical missionaries. It was drawing local professionals to become converted and apply
their faith to their jobs as well as through a variety of community programs from the church.
Puzynin flagged down a private taxi, its mirror holding an icon and a cross, so Puzynin
immediately started to converse with the driver. It turned out the young driver had
encountered Orthodoxy and then become a Pentecostal, but he was no longer active
religiously. I was reminded of the American phrase ‘been there, done that’; now, he was
jaded. They talked a bit about social and political changes; our driver had a university degree
and, according to him, some of the changes were welcome, other aspects of the socialist
system were preferable. So Puzynin invited him to come to the meeting where we were
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going; he could even come later after his shift, because there would be a fellowship hour with
the band playing, and the people were young like him and friendly.
Around 2008, Nikolai Kornilov took me along on a Saturday morning (I had been
teaching at Moscow Baptist Seminary that week) to a gathering of pastors, all of them leading
new evangelical congregations in the distant suburbs surrounding Moscow. We started with
personal sharing, and after a while, I was hearing phrases that sounded familiar from pastors
in the USA. Young parents were busy with jobs, trying to fix up their flats or apartments,
spending time with their children and friends. They had been very enthusiastic as young
Christians, doing many volunteer tasks in evangelism and social service, but now there was a
change. Some were less frequent at Sunday services, needing to sleep in, tired from a busy
work week. The years before there were always new people, the seekers, wanting to learn
about Christian faith. That had ended; most were no longer interested, were returning to their
usual Sunday rest times by washing the car and watching television. How were these pastors
to encourage each other? At least they were sharing openly, some getting counsel from others
on dealing with cases, but there was a pervasive sense that living out a congregation’s faith
witness was again onerous and slow.
That was one form of encountering an unfriendly society, its reversion to living as if
religion matters little for their daily affairs. Was this true in other cities, especially areas
across Russia where the comforts of jobs and availability of goods were more limited than
was true in capital cities like St. Petersburg, Kiev, and Moscow?7
What was changing in cities and their hinterlands in many parts of the Russian
Federation and Central Asia, was a societal shift back to the command economy that the
perestroika era was to eradicate. Local officials at many levels reasserted their suspicion of
alien elements, such as the evangelicals who had the closest ties with the West that political
leaders were now warning against. The capacity for extensive church ministries in the
community was being blocked: there was eventually (2015) even a Russian law prohibiting
missionizing or evangelizing outside religious buildings, and more obstacles permitting the
functioning of religious institutions.

7

Several scholarly attempts to assess the evangelical role in the post-soviet era have been published, that I
warmly recommend since I lack space to cover them: Forum 18, Dvadtsat’ let religiosnoi svobody i aktivnoi
missii v postsovetskom obshchestve. Itogi, problemy, perspektivy evangel’skikh tserkvei [20 years of religious
freedom and active mission in post-Soviet society. Results, problems, perspectives from the evangelical
churches] (Kiev: Dukh i Literatura, 2011, 28 contributors from Ukraine and elsewhere). See also Joshua T.
Searle and Myhailo N. Cherenkov, A Future and a Hope. Mission, Theological Education, and the
Transformation of Post-Soviet Society (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2014).
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Franz Tissen, Evangelical Christian Baptists (hereafter ECB) President in Kazakhstan,
is a long-time promoter of systematic expansion of evangelistic witness to every oblast in
Kazakhstan, which resulted in numerous new congregations where worship then proceeded in
Russian and indigenous languages. Tissen sent out an appeal, after the 2011 restrictive law on
religion, to fellow believers now living in Germany, to pray for them since conditions for
church practice were again more difficult. Congregations had to seek re-registration, with
more stringent conditions to meet, such as size of community. Forum 18 cited cases where
the dissident ECB congregations that refused state registration, as before 1991, were being
fined for unauthorized activities, leaders were arrested and given prison terms. The number of
Jehovah’s Witnesses refusing military service, and therefore arrested and sentenced to prison,
was increasing from month to month. Then finally, in 2016, the Jehovah’s Witness church in
the Russian Federation was banned as an extremist organization.8 That action got noticed and
reported in the West at least, with some dismay that a more authoritarian rule under Putin and
his anti-Western rhetoric was reminiscent of old Soviet practices.
Yet the most severe treatments in the Central Asian countries seemed reserved for the
most active Muslims, sentenced to severe fines and prison terms for having or distributing
published Islamic theology by Said Nursi, for example, on grounds that such Muslim
behavior was ‘extremist’ or ‘terrorist’. So new or old forms of persecution of faith practice
were returning, even the prominent Orthodox churchmen no longer protested. In October
2017 Kazakhstan’s Religion and Civil Society Ministry published a draft of revisions to the
2011 Religion Law, with restrictions on parents’ and children’s freedoms, more restrictions
on sharing belief, and more censorship. In so doing it was ignoring the legal
recommendations of the UN Human Rights Committee and the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe. It referred to a comparative table to show similarities and differences
with such laws in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Kyrgyzstan.9 That may sound
bureaucratic, but what it implied was that Kazakhstan was still less actively controlling
religious practice than was the case in traditionally more actively Muslim societies.
To stick with recent summaries of reporting of violations of religious rights, Forum 18
in October 2017 reported cases of torture in city after city in Uzbekistan, which included
beatings, freezing conditions, and sexual violations including raping of women—those
8

An online weekly newsletter Forum 18, March 5, 2018, reported 24 criminal convictions for religious
activities in 2018 alone, with more imminent. Forum 18, January 31, 2018 presented a detailed list of “279
administrative prosecutions,” 259 of them receiving punishments of fines, short term jail terms, temporary or
permanent bans on religious activity, deportations, seizure of property and religious literature.
9
Forum 18, October 10, 2017, giving extensive detail.
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reporting insisted on remaining anonymous because of likely reprisals by the state. Officials
denied charges, some even stating that they would not be punished if reported. Forum 18 also
noted that a review by the UN Committee on Torture spoke of ‘torture or the threat of it’ as
‘routine’ in 2007. In that organization’s later concluding report of 2013, it spoke of
numerous, ongoing and consistent allegations that torture and ill-treatment are
routinely used by law enforcement... [that] leads to a climate of impunity for officials
and the absence of the rule of law ...[plus] unjust trials with flagrant breaches of due
process...10
In Tajikistan, nearly 2,000 mosques were closed and converted to secular uses in 2017,
always with the claim that it was ‘at the request of local residents.’11 There had been many
thriving evangelical congregations in Uzbekistan during the last few decades of Soviet power,
and a seminary/college was opened in the 1990s. Yet at a Bible School in Kazakhstan around
2007, where I was teaching, about a dozen students from Uzbekistan attended, since the
school where they had studied was closed.
It was a new time of testing the quality of faith one claimed, of testing one’s readiness
to show solidarity to oppressed minorities. Given the shift to independent national ECB
unions, also true of other evangelical communities, the structures for information sharing
were missing, and gradually, stronger evangelical communities in Russia, Ukraine, and
Moldova were less able to send assistance, including literature.
The revised law on religion of 1997 in Russia occurred in the context of a politically
inspired turn against the West, and its missionaries. The length of visas for foreigners in
Russia was steadily reduced, until such residents were required to exit and return every three
months, soon a financial impossibility for missionaries, less so for business persons. Many
affected negatively by the new restrictions of 1997 sent appeals directly to the President
without response, and the anti-West atmosphere was such that the Duma approved the
restrictive legislation that included a variety of increased anti-terror surveillance measures, as
well as close supervision of the missionaries’ activities. Soon, most of the mission agency
offices in Moscow had closed, leaving the Russian evangelicals with a more pronounced
sense of isolation and minority status.

10
11

Forum 18, October 12, 2017.
Forum 18, February 26, 2018.
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Evangelical Discord: Is There a Better Way Forward?
During earlier periods of faith testing under Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, too
often this was followed by discord within evangelical circles. These were times when it
seemed more certain what belonged to Caesar, to whom one could not give ultimate
allegiance, and what belonged to God and one dare not violate one’s conscience. So there had
been patterns of capitulation to the atheist campaigns, and patterns of resisting and suffering
the cost. In the post-war revival era, many of the new evangelical converts were really those
who had surrendered to the forces of evil, who repented and found the gift of forgiveness, of
divine grace, and increasingly the gift of Christian fellowship to help them face a society still
seriously hostile to Christian faith.
Soon after Vladimir Putin was appointed by Yeltsin as his successor (1998), large
sections of the Russian population, including evangelicals, became more aware of the close
links between Russian Orthodoxy and the Russian state. Putin was shown on television taking
communion in the Cathedral of the Savior, with Patriarch Kirill officiating. In connection
with Putin’s increasingly frequent references to a form of Russianness that included all
‘Russians’ in the ‘near abroad’ for whose welfare the Russian state had obligations, to the
point of the right to interfere in the independent countries such as Ukraine for the welfare of
the Russians there, an ethnic majoritarian emphasis seemed troubling. Early in the new
century, Patriarch Kirill seemed to have changed his earlier inclusivist approach, to articulate
a doctrine of Russian Orthodoxy. Whether this was in the vein of the surprising claim in
Kirill’s 1994 mission declaration about canonical territory that belongs to Russian Orthodoxy,
or if he was feeling pressure from brother bishops to stay in step with President Putin’s
national notions is not clear. But it has been the Russian evangelicals, as fully Russian/Soviet
in identity since at least 1950, who have struggled with national identity. According to
Romans 13 understanding, some church leaders, such as Riakhovsky of the national
Pentecostal Union and chair of the inter-evangelical council through which evangelicals
negotiated with state officials, began sounding uncritically pro-Putin.
In Ukraine, there had been political divisions behind the demonstrations at the Maidan
square in Kiev, soon known as the ‘Orange’ Revolution because of its non-violent style,
including with clergy and lay Christian mediation between groups. When it became apparent
that the Ukrainian President, whose electoral victory was under challenge, was corrupt by
enriching himself and secretly negotiating for the Russian commercial union, the second
Maidan demonstration became the focus for forcing President Yanukovich out, and he sought
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sanctuary in Russia. Then followed the election of Poroshchenko (June 2014), a Ukrainian
oligarch with a successful business, but with a prime minister with pro-American leanings,
and during the interval the temporary state President was Oleksandr Turtchinov.12
Turtchinov had converted from his youthful role as Komsomol leader to baptism and
membership in a Baptist church, where he took his turn as lay preacher, then also wrote three
novels, similar in apocalyptic tones to the American Left Behind series President George W.
Bush enjoyed reading. Among Turtchinov’s main anxieties was the rise of a world
government, as so many fundamentalist evangelicals have imagined the United Nations to
become, or in Russia currently the rising influence of President Putin toward leader of a new
Byzantium, a third Rome. 13 Turtchinov, as deputy to Julia Tymoshenko, leader of the
Fatherland Party, was very prominent during the Second Maidan demonstration, labelled
‘Revolution of Values.’ Next to the presence of Cardinal Husar (Ukrainian Greek-Catholic
Church) and Patriarch Filaret (of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church–Kievan Patriarchate),
Turtchinov as an evangelical was the more prominent politician. Soon after, he also headed
the Ukrainian secret service for internal affairs, that is, Turtchinov helped establish popular
recognition of Ukraine as religiously pluralist.
Yet when the Russian Baptist Union (RUECB) met in St Petersburg in May 2014, two
months after the Maidan demonstration in Kiev had begun, it issued a condemnation of
Baptists and other Christians in Kiev, with the line:
… we proclaim commitment to Biblical teaching, which does not accept the violent
overthrow of legitimate authority, nor nationalism, nor the resolution of sociopolitical differences through means other than political negotiation. ‘Do not join with
rebellious officials.’ (Proverbs 24:21)14

For details I am relying on Mykhailo Cherenkov, “Die Geschichte vom “blutigen Pastor,” Religion &
Gesellschaft in Ost und West, Nr. 3, 2018, 20-22.
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Alena Alshanskaya, “Das Erbe von Byzanz im geschichts-politischen Diskurs Russlands,” Religion &
Gesellschaft in Ost und West, Nr. 7/8/2017, 26-29. Bishop Tikhon (Shevkunov) as archimandrite and trained in
filming, had in 2008 produced the documentary The Fall of an Empire: Lessons from Byzantium, where Tikhon
used the Byzantine heritage to draw analogies to the Third Rome, that now Putin would pursue. There followed
numerous articles in the Russian press, also a talk show on state TV. Tikhon continued writing in this vein for
<http://www.pravoslavie.ru> in spite of then Patriarch Alexei II rejecting the analogy to Byzantium, until in
November 2014 an academic conference on Moscow as Third Rome was held. The tone was anti-Western,
Russia was to incorporate the other civilization, the other Europe. Vsevolod Chaplin’s replacement in December
2015 as head of the Synod’s department for church and society relations was Aleksandr Shchishchipkov, a
journalist. With the annexation of Crimea, Shchishchipkov spoke of a ‘polyethnic Russian nation’ where various
ethnic and social groups would be united in a Russian values matrix, as heritage from Byzantium. Soon after the
Tsargrad-TV of Orthodox oligarch Konstantin Malofaev pursued this theme. Putin at Kherson in Crimea in
2015 declared it “the sacred source of the Russian nation and its central Asian states.” When on 28 May 2016
the Mount Athos community celebrated the 1000 year anniversary of the presence of Russian monks at Mount
Athos, Putin was assigned to sit on the throne reserved for the Byzantine Caesar.
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The second resolution from that St Petersburg RUECB Congress addressed to Russian
President Vladimir Putin, included the lines of gratitude “for defining and strengthening of
the spiritual and moral values, to which the traditional family belongs...” Further they pray
that Putin will have “the strength and courage to remain true to the struggle against
manifestations of xenophobia and in the preservation of interconfessional peace in Russia.”15
To this the newly elected president of the All-Ukrainian UECB Valerii Antoniuk, in
an interview in the RUECB news service, stated that “if a people speaks the truth, seeks
justice, wishes freedom from corruption and desires honest living, then Christians are always
called to support that.” As to the coup of February 2014, Antoniuk cited Bonhoeffer’s line
that “obedience to tyrants is equal to disobedience towards God.”16 Anatoly Kaluzhny (Kiev),
bishop of the Union of Independent Evangelical Churches in Ukraine, described the Russian
Baptist gratitude statement to Putin for cultivating moral values in society as “the highest
form of blasphemy. We know how he lives.”16
Truth telling was the moral power that accounted for the non-violent moral
revolutions that transformed the former Marxist socialist states of Eastern Europe into more
participatory democracies, all in that remarkable year of 1989.17 That was what Havel had in
mind with his “power of the powerless”, a clear reference to the Apostle Paul’s remark in
Corinthians: “when I am weak, then am I strong.” It was what Jesus meant in the Sermon on
the Mount about “the meek shall inherit the earth.” In the first edition of his commentary of
Martin Luther’s Bible in 1521, Luther stated, “indeed, without violence.” After the Peasant
Wars of 1525, Luther dropped the line from later editions, until the German Democratic
Republic (GDR) in 1984 reprinted that first edition!
The truth telling is also “the liberation and the burden.” In the 1990s, there developed
many Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, of which the South African one headed by
Bishop Desmond Tutu seems the best known. In some countries in Latin America,
Philippines, or the GDR, these heavy burden processes made a difference; in the regions of
the former Soviet Union there was a phase of opening the archives, of rehabilitation of many
falsely accused and long dead, until the population got over-saturated with horror stories. In a
book, which includes photo evidence, published by Masha Gesson, she surveyed the mass
graves for Jews and other unwanted marginalized peoples. The Memorial Society got
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Ibid.
17
Walter Sawatsky, “Truth Telling: The Liberation and the Burden,” Journal of Church and State Vol. 33
(1991): 701-729.
16

OCCASIONAL PAPERS ON RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE (NOVEMBER 2019) XXXIX, 6

66

organized to dig up the dead, identify them, and bury them with respect. But the sad part is
the way the Russian government had steadily placed more obstacles in the way of such
memory work.18
As we have cast our glances across Eurasian and Eastern European evangelical
activities, we have noted the ways in which even the internationally committed evangelical
traditions have been sorely tempted by the god of nationhood, of wanting to belong, of ending
the two centuries of marginalization. Evangelicals and oppression have been intertwined
because everywhere it was a marginal movement of renewal and reformation, and now in the
opening decades of the twenty-first century, state-sponsored majoritarianism appears to be
winning. But those marginal evangelicals did not disappear, indeed, they now constitute
almost the second largest block of Christianity globally, next to Roman Catholics. Wherever
such evangelicals have sought to dominate, or even to ride on the coattails of socially
dominant movements, they have lost moral stature. How to stand in solidarity with other free
churches, how to help them recover their faithfulness, how we ourselves might recover the
moral energy of compassion for the needy among us? Those are the challenges.
None of the split-away evangelical unions in the former Soviet Union regions have so
far found the way to reconciliation, though thankfully there have been many serious attempts.
Now one scarcely knows how to report the gap between Ukrainian and Russian Baptists, to
say nothing of the way Georgian Baptists, attempting to be as contextually adoptive of
Georgian culture as current missiology theory calls us to risk, were invited to leave the EuroAsian ECB Federation. How does one get to that breadth of divine mercy of John 3.16?

Conclusion
Let me conclude with a few quotations from Christian leaders who worked very
closely together in Maidan for months during 2014. Mikhailo Dymid, professor for theology
and ecclesiology at the Ukrainian Catholic University in Lviv, tried to describe a responsible
public theology, that he called the theology of Maidan.19 It was an emerging theology across
the confessional boundaries, especially through frequent personal encounters, seeking to
“grasp the theological meaning for social transformation” in their case to overcome the
Masha Geeson and Misha Friedman, Never Remember. Searching for Stalin’s Gulags in Putin’s Russia (New
York: Columbia Global Reports, 2018).
19
Mykhailo Dymyd, “Die Theologie des Majdan,” Religion & Gesellschaft in Ost und West, Nr. 3, 2018, 14-16.
Dymid, theology professor at Ukrainian Catholic University (Lviv), presented an integration of public theology
statement by Baptist theologian Mykhailo Cherenko, Greek Catholic Bishop Boris Gudziak, sociologist
Ljudmila Fylypovytsch [all spelling from German spellings of Ukrainian. Author’s trans. from German].
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culture of corruption. It became a theology against the status quo, that is, each confessional
representative’s status quo. It was about finding “a Christian way to address social settings of
need.” One priest spoke of a new ecclesial consciousness, a unity around the Eucharist, where
“there were no Greek-Catholics, Roman Catholics, or Orthodox... just Christians. That was
completely open and public, that is what we must understand.”20
Above all, at least to my astonishment, they reached a political theology through
prayer: “It is in prayer that the demonstrators themselves develop a political theology, in the
way they formulate the ideals and contours of the civil society they desire.” Archbishop
Schevtschuk (Uniate) declared, “we are convinced that to pray for peace together with those,
who in a peaceful way express their desire to live in a Rechtstaat, is an appropriate prayer
request.”21 And Ludmila Filipovich observed that Maidan
taught the people to listen to themselves and to others...to learn things they had never
done before--it taught us to pray personally and collectively. Prayers changed their
behavior, it conveyed to them ideas about reconciliation, and love, and respect.
[Prayers] gave them hope, they united people.22
Postscript
The historically savvy reporter on the Velvet Revolution, Timothy Garton Ash,
described the aftermath when the dissidents had assumed power by a phrase recalling the
years after the 1789 French revolution: Après le déluge – nous. It had become common in
Slavic languages during 1989 to speak of ‘them’ (oni) as the distant other, those in power
who should be blamed; versus ‘us’ (myi)—the people. A German slogan had been “wir sind
das Volk” (we are the people)—a new identity discovery declaring responsibility for the
civitas. As in post-revolutionary France, responsible peoplehood turned out to be fleeting.
Without minimizing the public theology and theology of collective prayers quoted
above, it is prudent to cite a book review entitled The Revolution that Wasn’t22 which this
writer noticed upon returning from the conference in Amsterdam. Paul Quinn-Judge, a
reporter on Russia since 1986, used two new books whose authors interviewed many
participants in the Maidan “revolution,” as well as leading persons in the so-called Donetsk
Peoples’ Republic. The result was sobering: leaders of those Russia supported “republics”
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had “zero administrative experience and barely knew one another;” “Right-Sector” supporters
did not support that group’s ideology but saw them as “the only structure that has not sold out
and will not sell out.”
At the same time, many Ukrainians were frustrated by President Poroshenko’s “failure
to address the systemic corruption that permeates all aspects of life.” The people had too
easily trusted a small group of Maidan negotiators, who had “quickly moved into power after
Maidan,” the demonstrators were marginalized, with “no regime change.”23
That does not look promising for evangelicals in either Russia or Ukraine. The
temptation to nationalism has not left them unaffected, but to negotiate a way of integrity
within the corruption that “permeates all aspects” seems more personal and more daunting. It
may help to recall how much corruption was the Soviet Union’s undoing, and how often
people seeking out the evangelicals for their secret to honorable living, had noticed their
costly discipleship.
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